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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
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:
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v.
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JODY DALE PARKE,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20070840-CA

:

INTRODUCTION
Officer Anderson's frisk was not based on reasonable suspicion that Parke was
armed and presently dangerous. The totality of the circumstances shows that Officer
Anderson could have safely observed and questioned Parke in order to substantiate or
dispel his suspicions, but he chose not to. Instead, even though Parke had readily
complied with all of his orders and Parke's hands were outside the vehicle where he
could see them, Officer Anderson immediately frisked Parke. Thus, this Court should
hold that the frisk violated the Fourth Amendment.
ARGUMENT
THE FRISK VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BECAUSE
IT WAS UNREASONABLE UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES
The totality of the circumstances in this case did not create a reasonable suspicion
that Parke was '"armed and presently dangerous to the officer or others.'" State v.

Warren, 2003 UT 36, ^[13, 78 P.3d 590 (citation omitted). First, the inherent danger in all
traffic stops did not create a reasonable suspicion that justified the frisk in this case. See
infra at Part A. This is especially true since the stop was for a minor traffic violation and
questioning Parke while his hands were outside the window or ordering him from the
vehicle would have mitigated any potential danger. See id. Second, nothing about the
time or place of the stop suggested that Parke was armed and presently dangerous. See
infra at Part B. Third, Parke's shoulder movement and compliant (but somewhat
agitated) demeanor during the stop did not create a reasonable suspicion that he was
armed and presently dangerous. See infra at Part C.
A.

The Inherent Danger In All Traffic Stops Did Not Create a Reasonable
Suspicion that Justified the Frisk, Especially Since the Stop Was For a Minor
Traffic Violation and Questioning Parke or Ordering Him Out of the Vehicle
Would Have Mitigated Any Potential Danger.
Parke does not dispute "that there are inherent safety concerns in all traffic stops."

Warren, 2003 UT 36 at <fl23 (citation omitted). "[0]fficers facc a n inordinate risk when
approaching a person seated in an automobile." IcL (citing Michigan v. LonR, 463 U.S.
1032, 1048 (1983)). "Due to this inherent dangerousness, courts allow officers to take
certain precautions to protect themselves without having to justify their actions based on
reasonable suspicion." Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ^[24. These precautions include "ordering
a person out of a car or conducting background checks," but do not include Terry frisks.
Id. at ^[25 (citations omitted). A Terry frisk "is an intrusion of a greater magnitude" and
may only be performed when the officer "reasonably believes [thej person is 'armed and
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presently dangerous to the officer or others.'" Id. at ^[13 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1,24(1968)).
When evaluating the reasonableness of a frisk, "the inherent dangerousness of all
traffic stops is a factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances analysis."
Warren, 2003 UT 36 at l|f22. When considering this factor, however, a court must also
consider its flipside: The danger inherent in a traffic stop "can be fully or partially
mitigated by ordering the occupants out of the vehicle." Id at !fl[22, 27; see Maryland v.
Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997) ("Outside the car, the passengers will be denied access
to any possible weapon . . ."); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977)
("Establishing a face-to-face confrontation . . . reduces the likelihood that the officer will
be the victim of an assault."). Thus, in Warren, our supreme court held that "both the
inherent dangerousness of the traffic stop and any reduction in that danger resulting from
ordering the occupants out of the vehicle should be factored into the totality of the
circumstances analysis." Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ^22 (emphasis added).
In Long, the United States Supreme Court held that officers are not required "to
adopt alternate measures to avoid a legitimate Terry-type intrusion. Long, 463 U.S. at
1052 n.16. Ordering a person from his vehicle, however, is not an "alternate means to
ensure" the officer's safety. Id, at 1052; see Aple. Br. at 20. To the contrary, it is a
necessary precursor to the Terry frisk: "To perform a Terry frisk, an officer must order
the occupants from the vehicle." Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ^|27. Likewise, observing and
questioning a person in order to assess whether the person is armed and presently
dangerous is not an "alternate means to ensure" the officer's safety. Long, 463 U.S. at
3

1052. Rather, it is an essential part of the officer's "duty." State v. White, 856 P.2d 656,
661, 665 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
If officers sense danger, then they can order a person out of the vehicle. See
Warren, 2003 UT 36 at *|j24 (citations omitted). Once the person is out of the vehicle,
officers have a duty to assess whether the facts at that moment warrant a frisk. See id. at
^|14 ("To determine reasonableness, a court should question whether 'the facts available
to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search "warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.'" (citations omitted)
(emphasis added)). In all cases, especially "simple traffic stop[s]," the officers'
assessment should include that the danger was "fully or partially mitigated by ordering
the occupants out of the vehicle." Id. at 1fl|22, 27. Then, if "[circumstances allow[] the
officers time to reassess . . . their initial suspicions of danger without being subjected to
'unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties,'" the officers should resolve their
suspicions "by questioning [the] defendant." White, 856 P.2d at 666 (citing Terry, 392
U.S. at 23).
The State concedes that the stop involved in this case was a simple traffic stop and
"not the kind of offense which by its very nature gives rise to a reasonable suspicion that
the suspect was armed and dangerous." Aple. Br. at 8 (citation omitted). As explained
below and in the opening brief, this stop contained few, if any, "other indicia of
dangcrousness." Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ^j27. Thus, ordering Parke out of the vehicle
"clearly mitigate[dj the inherent dangerousness of the stop." Id.; see Aplt. Br. at 14-26.

4
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The Time and Place of the Stop Did Not Create Any Reasonable Suspicion
that Parke Was Armed and Presently Dangerous.
As explained by the State, "Officer Anderson's characterization of the area [he

patrols] as 'very dangerous' came without qualification, suggesting that the area is
generally dangerous regardless of the time." Aple. Br. at 11. This is precisely the
problem.
An officer may not justify a frisk by broadly declaring that the entire area he
patrols is dangerous at all times of day and night. See Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ^33
(holding "credence should not be given to hunches, but to specific reasonable inferences .
. ." (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27)). This is especially true when that area includes a
popular movie theater. R. 41. This amounts to no more that an '"inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or "hunch."'" Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ^14 (citations omitted);
see Aple. Br. at 11 (conceding that "there may be times when the area is more, or less,
dangerous than at other times"). Rather, to justify a frisk, the "officer must be able to
point to specific facts which, considered with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant the intrusion." Id. at ^14 (citation omitted).
Officer Anderson provided none of the specific facts necessary to legitimize his
broad assertion that the entire area he patrols is "very dangerous" at all times of day and
night. R. 41. At 9:30 pm, many people will be driving through the area that Officer
Anderson patrols for any number of innocuous reasons—going to or coming from a
movie, going home from work, getting groceries, or running errands. And any of these
people might stop for gas. To assume that all these people "carry weapons or are
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otherwise dangerous," Aple. Br. at 11, and then frisk them if they move their shoulder is
to proceed on an '"inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch."'" Warren, 2003
UT 36 at ^fl4 (citations omitted).
Worse, allowing such a frisk would make frisks automatic in virtually every traffic
stop for a minor traffic violation in Officer Anderson's undefined patrol area, regardless
of the time or other circumstances. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94 (1979) ("the
'narrow scope' of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than
reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked."); Warren, 2003 UT 36
at *p4 (holding officer must demonstrate the need to frisk by "pointing] to specific facts
which, considered with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the
intrusion" (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21)); People v. Cassel, 100 Cal. Rptr. 520, 523 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1972) (holding fast hand movement did not justify frisk because allowing
officers to "routinely search for weapons in all such instances would . . . constitute an
'intolerable and unreasonable' intrusion into the privacy of the vast majority of peaceable
citizens who travel by automobile"); People v. Moray, 35 Cal. Rptr. 432, 434 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1963) (holding if "arm motion" during stop constituted "probable cause" to search
"then practically every motorist in California who receives or is about to receive a traffic
citation will be subject to having his person and his automobile searched by the traffic
officer—such is fortunately not the law"); cf. State v. White, 856 P.2d at 656, 665 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993) (declining to validate "automatic frisk based on [suspectcdj . . . cocaine
use" because cocaine use "is not a crime of violence comparable to dealing in large
quantities of drugs").
6

C.

When Viewed Within the Totality of the Circumstances, Parke's Shoulder
Movement and Demeanor During the Stop Did Not Create a Reasonable
Suspicion that He Was Armed and Presently Dangerous,
First, an officer is not permitted to frisk a person based on a mere "inference" that

the person '"may be armed and presently dangerous.'" Aple. Br. at 13 (citations
omitted). To the contrary, an officer "may perform a protective frisk" only when he
"reasonably believes [the] person is 'armed and presently dangerous to the officer or
others/" Warren, 2003 UT 36 at *f 13. When "determining reasonableness, 'due weight
must be given, not to |an officer's] inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch,"
but to specific reasonable inferences which [an officer] is entitled to draw from the [nets
in light of his experience.'" Id. at ^14 (citation omitted) (alterations in original). Thus,
the question in this case is not whether Officer Anderson could infer from Parke's
movements that he was concealing "either a weapon or narcotics." Aple. Br. at 13.
Rather, the question is whether Officer Anderson identified specific reasonable
inferences that entitled him to reasonably believe Parke was armed and presently
dangerous. See Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ffi[13-14.
Second, a person's movements are not "furtive" simply because an officer says
they are. Aple. Br. at 13; sec Warren, 2003 UT 36 at p 3 ; State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506,
511 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("*[F]rom the viewpoint of the observer, an innocent gesture
can often be mistaken for a guilty movement.'" (citations omitted)). This is true even if
the officer has special training and experience. See Warren, 2003 UT 36 at p 3
(disregarding "officer's entitlement to draw upon his or her experience," where "the facts
leading to [officer's] suspicion are too attenuated to justify the inference"). Rather, the
7

reasonableness of a frisk is "evaluated objectively according to the totality of the
circumstances." Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ^fl4 (citations omitted). While an "officer's
subjective belief may be a factor in the objective analysis," "the officer must be able to
point to specific facts which, considered with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant the intrusion." Id. (citation omitted).
Thus, in State v. Schlosscr, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), our supreme court's
determination that the defendant's movements were innocuous did not hinge on the
officer's failure to cite "safety concerns as the basis for his actions." Schlosser, 774 P.2d
at 1137 (citations omitted). The court acknowledged the officer's subjective belief as a
factor in its analysis. See id. But the bulk of its analysis focused on the defendant's
actual movements. Id. at 1138. The officer saw the defendant (a passenger) "bending
forward, acting fidgety, turning to the left and to the right, and turning back 1o look at the
officer" as the vehicle stopped and "continu[ingJ to move about in the cab" as he spoke to
the driver outside the vehicle. Id. at 1133-34. Our supreme court determined these
movements were innocuous because:
[Defendant] may have been attempting to locate a driver's license. He could have
been preparing for conversation with the officer by turning down the volume on
the radio or extinguishing a cigarette. He may also have been putting away food
and beverages, changing a baby's diaper, putting on the parking brake or doing a
host of other innocuous things. When confronted with a traffic stop, it is not
uncommon for drivers and passengers alike to be nervous and excited and to turn
to look at an approaching police officer. See State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 184
(Utah 1987). A search based on such common gestures and movements is a mere
"hunch," not an articulable suspicion that satisfies the Fourth Amendment.
Id at 1138.
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Similarly, in White, this Court's determination that the defendant's movements
were innocuous did not hinge on the officer's statement that his "observation of
defendant while in the vehicle and while exiting it gave 'no indication that [defendant]
was armed/" White, 856 P.2d at 658 (alteration in original). Although this Court
mentioned the officer's subjective belief in its statement of the case's background, its
analysis focused on the defendant's actual movements. Id. at 661. "In reviewing the
record, we note | the officer's] testimony that his observation of defendant prior to
meeting him was limited to seeing 'defendant [] kind of leaning off to his side a little
bit.'" Id This gesture "was innocuous." Id; see also Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ^33
(holding frisk not justified because officer's "suspicions of drug activity or prostitution
[were] better classified as hunches," defendant's "cooperativeness, denial of being armed,
and the absence of alarming actions further negate[d] the reasonableness argument,"
officer "testified repeatedly that he did not have any reason to believe that [defendant]
was armed and dangerous," and officer's "removal of [defendant] from the vehicle
decreased the inherent dangerousness of the traffic stop").
In this case, Officer Anderson saw Parke move his shoulder. R. 41. Subjectively,
he believed the movement might indicate that Parke was "reaching towards [the]
waistband area" and, based on his "past experiences," believed that people making "those
movements" are "concealing either weapons or narcotics." R. 41-42. But Officer
Anderson is an officer trained to expect danger and likely "approached the scene with a
preconceived notion—consciously or subconsciously—of what gestures he expected to
see and what he expected them to mean." Holmes, 774 P.2d at 511 (citation omitted).
9

Further, "[wjhile respecting an officer's entitlement to draw upon his or her
experience, the facts leading to Officer [Anderson's | suspicion are too attenuated to
justify the inference." Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ^33. Without more information, a
shoulder movement is innocuous. See Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1138 (holding "'movements,
turning to the left and to the right, appearing fidgety, bending forward, and turning to
look at the officer, do not, without more, show a reasonable possibility that criminal
conduct has occurred or is about to occur"); White, 856 P.2d at 661. As conceded by the
State, a number of "innocent explanations" exist for Parke's movement. Aple. Br. at 13.
As is common "for drivers and passengers alike," Parke could have been "attempting to
locate a driver's license," "preparing for conversation with the officer by turning down
the volume on the radio or extinguishing a cigarette," "putting away food and beverages,"
"putting on the parking brake or doing a host of other innocuous things." Schlosser, 774
P.2d at 1138 (citation omitted).
Besides, Officer Anderson's subjective viewpoint is just one factor in the
reasonableness analysis. S^e Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ^[14; State v. Baker, 2008 UT App
115,1|15, 182 P.3d 935. The remainder of the circumstances belies his belief and shows
that a frisk was not justified because questioning Parke while his hands were outside the
window and/or ordering him from the vehicle would have "mitigate[d] the inherent
dangerousness of the stop." Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ^|27. Although it was dark outside,
Parke was driving in an area of town used by all citizens; he was stopped for a minor
traffic violation; he readily obeyed the signal to stop; he was alone in the vehicle; he was
stopped at 9:30 pm in a popular movie theater parking lot (a time when the parking lot
10

was presumably lit and populated with movie-goers); and Officer Anderson was a trained
and armed police officer and was accompanied by a trained and armed backup officer. R.
41-43; 122:4-5.
True, Parke became "somewhat agitated" when Officer Anderson ordered him to
put his hands out the window and questioned the order, but he readily complied and did
not move to replace his hands in the vehicle or otherwise disobey the order, R. 42.
While not ideal, this reaction did not invoke suspicion that he was armed and presently
dangerous. It did not involve "loud and boisterous behavior." Warren, 2003 UT 36 at
^33 (listing "loud and boisterous behavior" as an "obvious articulable factfj that would
make the [reasonableness] determination easier"). Nor did it involve "unprovoked flight"
or other "evasive behavior." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (listing
"unprovoked flight upon noticing the police" and other "nervous, evasive behavior"" as
"a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion" (citations omitted)). Rather, as
explained in the opening brief, it was one of several natural responses a person might
have when he is stopped for a minor traffic violation and is suddenly ordered to put his
hands outside the vehicle. SQQ Aplt. Br. at 22.
In sum, a frisk "'is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person' and should
not be taken lightly." Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ^13 (citation omitted). Rather, it must be
based on "'specific reasonable inferences which [an officer] is entitled to draw from the
facts in light of his experience.'" Id. at ^14 (citation omitted). In this case, Officer
Anderson's frisk was not based on reasonable suspicion that Parke was armed and
presently dangerous. See Aplt. Br. at 12-26. The totality of the circumstances shows that
11

he could have safely observed and questioned Parke in order to substantiate or dispel his
suspicions, but he chose not to. R. 38-51. Instead, even though Parke had readily
complied with all of his orders and Parke's hands were outside the vehicle wrhere he
could see them, Officer Anderson immediately frisked Parke. R. 38-51. Thus, this Court
should hold that the frisk violated the Fourth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse Parke's conviction because the trial court erred by
denying his motion to suppress the evidence taken in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
SUBMITTED this _ [ ] _ day of September, 2008.

&\*~ Q ' ^ T 3 ^
LORI J. SEPPI
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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